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Transsexuals and Critical Gender Theory: The




The voices of transsexuals have been ignored in our country and,
accordingly, few social and legal institutions have developed to support
the unique needs of this minority.' Yet one group of feminist theorists
who might be expected to ally with transsexuals in their struggle for rec-
ognition-scholars I will refer to as "critical gender theorists" 2-- hold a
* Professor of Law, University of Utah. B.A., 1971, Columbia College; B.Phil., 1973,
Oxford University; J.D., 1976, Yale University. I would like to thank Lee Teitelbaum for
comments on an earlier draft of this paper. This Article was funded in part by the University of
Utah College of Law Excellence in Teaching and Research Fund.
1. It is extremely difficult to determine the prevalence of transsexualism in the United
States. One study, based on data from smaller countries in Europe, estimates that roughly 1 per
30,000 adult males and 1 per 100,000 adult females seek sex reassignment surgery (less than
0.01 percent of the population). In the United States, an estimated 6,000 to 10,000 transsexuals
had undergone sex reassignment surgery by 1988, suggesting that the transsexual population in
the United States is much less than 0.01 percent. See MILDRED L. BROWN & CHLOE ANN
ROUNSLEY, TRUE SELVES: UNDERSTANDING TRANSSEXUALISM-FOR FAMILIES, FRIENDS,
COWORKERS, AND HELPING PROFESSIONALS 8-9 (1996).
2. Among the scholars I label as critical gender theorists who discuss the transsexual
phenomenon are the following: BERNICE L. HAUSMAN, CHANGING SEX (1995); GORDENE 0.
MAcKENzIE, TRANSGENDER NATION (1994); JANICE G. RAYMOND, THE TRANSSEXUAL
EMPIRE: THE MAKING OF THE SHE-MALE (1994); Dwight B. Billings & Thomas Urban, The
Socio-Medical Construction of Transsexualism, in BLENDING GENDERS: SOCIAL ASPECTS OF
CROSS DRESSING AND SEX-CHANGING 99 (Richard Ekins & Dave King eds., 1996) [hereinafter
BLENDING GENDERS]; Anne Bolin, Transcending and Transgenderings: Male-to-Female
Transsexuals, Dichotomy and Diversity, in THIRD SEX, THIRD GENDER 447 (Gilbert Herdt ed.,
1994) [hereinafter Bolin, Transcending and Transgenderings]; Edward Sagarin, Transsexual-
ism: Legitimation, Amplification, and Exploitation of Deviance by Scientists and Mass Media,
in DEVIANCE AND MASS MEDIA 243 (Charles Winick ed., 1978).
These theorists do not speak with a unified voice on transsexualism. Perhaps the scholar
most critical of the transsexual phenomenon is Janice Raymond. Others, including Anne Bolin
and Bernice Hausman, while deeply sympathetic to the transsexual's situation, are critical of the
impact that medical technology has had on the personal identities that transsexuals construct for
themselves. Anne Bolin has produced some of the finest conceptual and empirical work on
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vision of gender that renders them extremely ambivalent toward the mes-
sages that emanate from the transsexual community.
My goals in this paper are twofold. First, I want to examine the
troubling tension that exists between transsexual voices and critical gen-
der theorists. Second, I want to explore whether alternative ways of con-
ceptualizing sex, gender, and gender identity can provide a common
ground for these groups to ally in the struggle for transsexual rights. To
these ends, in Part I, I contrast common features of the autobiographical
stories told by many male-to-female (hereinafter "MTF") transsexuals3
with the vision of gender subscribed to by critical gender theorists. In
Part II, I explore a common pursuit of both transsexuals and critical gen-
der theorists: challenging the Euro-American dimorphic vision of sex
and gender. In this section I also introduce two alternative views of gen-
der identity which may provide common conceptual ground to enable
critical gender theorists to ally with transsexuals. In Part I, I critique
these two alternative views of gender identity and discuss the practicality
of translating these views into social policy. It is in this last section of
the paper that I explore the possibility of a restroom labeled "Other."
transsexualism. Described as a "sympathetic critic," she is credited with "help[ing to] encour-
age the idea that there were different alternatives to be explored and that increasing numbers of
men and women have opted to live in the opposite gender without going through surgery or
have adopted a variety of lifestyles that depart from the dimorphic norms." GENDER BLENDING
24 (Bonnie Bullough et al. eds., 1997) [hereinafter GENDER BLENDING].
3. I rely on autobiographical statements of MTF transsexuals because they predominate in
the literature. Nonetheless, more recent autobiographies by female-to-male transsexuals suggest
many common perceptions with the personal accounts of MTF transsexuals. Autobiographical
accounts of MTF transsexuals include: J.J. ALLEN, THE MAN IN THE RED VELVET DRESS
(1996); KATE BORNSTEIN, GENDER OUTLAW (1994); STEPHANIE CASTLE, FEELINGS (1992);
CLAUDINE GRIGGS, PASSAGE THROUGH TRINIDAD (1996); JAN MORRIS, CONUNDRUM (1974);
RENIE RICHARDS, SECOND SERVE: THE RENI E RICHARDS STORY (1983). Autobiographical
accounts of female-to-male transsexuals include: LESLIE FEINBERG, TRANSGENDER WARRIORS
(1996); MARK REES, DEAR SIR OR MADAM (1996). Books by sociologists and psychologists
who work regularly with transsexuals and/or attempt to present the transsexual's viewpoint in-
clude: BROWN & ROUNSLEY, supra note 1; PAT CALIFIA, SEX CHANGES: THE POLITICS OF
TRANSGENDERISM (1997); RICHARD EKINS, MALE FEMALING (1997); FRANK LEwINs,
TRANSSEXUALISM IN SOCIETY: A SOCIOLOGY OF MALE-TO-FEMALE TRANSSEXUALS (1995).
Other useful works on transsexualism include: ANNE BOLIN, IN SEARCH OF EVE:
TRANSSEXUAL RITES OF PASSAGE (1988); VERN L. BULLOUGH & BONNIE BULLOUGH, CROSS
DRESSING, SEX, AND GENDER (1993); PHYLLIS BURKE, GENDER SHOCK: EXPLODING THE
MYTHS OF MALE AND FEMALE (1996); HOLLY DEVOR, FTM: FEMALE-TO-MALE
TRANSEXUALS IN SOCIETY (1997); RICHARD F. DOCTER, TRANSVESTITES AND
TRANSSEXUALS: TOWARD A THEORY OF CROSS-GENDER BEHAVIOUR (1988); DAVE KING,
THE TRANSVESTITE AND THE TRANSSEXUAL (1993); BLENDING GENDERS, supra note 2;
GENDER BLENDING, supra note 2.
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1. Transsexual Voices vs. Critical Gender Theory
I begin by examining the voices of MTF transsexuals, voices which
currently predominate the transsexual autobiographical literature.4 These
stories strongly suggest that an MTF transsexual's gender identity as fe-
male is more central to her sense of who she is as a person than is her
male biology. I then explore why critical gender theorists find such
autobiographical statements so troubling. Finally, I offer personal obser-
vations regarding the critique of the transsexual phenomenon presented
by these theorists.
A. Voices of Transsexuals5
An MTF transsexual often describes herself as a person locked,
trapped or imprisoned in the wrong body. Thus, an MTF transsexual's
self-perceived gender identity as female does not match her male geni-
tals. Many transsexuals report that their sense of being a member of the
4. See sources cited supra note 3.
5. While I readily admit there is no "typical" transsexual experience, in the same way
that there is no typical lesbian or gay experience, certain common themes emerge from the
autobiographical statements of MTF transsexuals.
6. It is important to contrast the description of transsexuals presented in the text with
other transgendered identities. Historically, within both the transgendered and the scholarly
communities, the term transvestite has been applied to a male with a strong desire to cross-
dress, but whose gender identity remains male and who has little interest in altering his biologi-
cal sex. Very often, psychologists have noted that there is a strong element of sexual gratifica-
tion associated with such cross-dressing behavior. In contrast, the term MTF transsexual ap-
plies to an individual with a male body, but whose internal sense of gender identity is female.
Such individuals are deemed to have an intense dislike of their male anatomy, wanting to
change it to match their gender identity.
Recent developments in both communities have led many to realize that there is no clear
distinction between a transvestite and a transsexual. In particular, it is extremely difficult, if
not impossible, to clearly discern the reasons why individuals choose to cross-dress. Accord-
ingly, the once carefully-drawn distinction between transvestites and transsexuals is slowly be-
ing abandoned as the term transgendered gains broader acceptance to refer to all such persons.
Anne Bolin observes:
The formation of a transgender community denotes a newfound kinship that supplants
the dichotomy of transsexual and transvestite with a concept of continuity, indicative
of a growing acceptance of nonsurgical options for men wishing to live as women.
An emerging sense of collectivity has propelled the recognition of the multiplicity of
gender variant identities.
Anne Bolin, Transforming Transvestism and Transsexualism: Polarity, Politics, and Gender, in
GENDER BLENDING, supra note 2, at 26 [hereinafter Bolin, Transforming Transvestism].
As discussed infra notes 97-98 and accompanying text, Kate Bornstein has proposed an
even broader usage of the term transgendered to refer to all persons who "transgress gender"
norms in any manner, including lesbian and gay persons. See BORNSTEIN, supra note 3, at
134-35.
opposite sex began very early in childhood.7 They often describe them-
selves as having sensed that they were supposed to have been born as
girls.
A transsexual's early sense of dissonance between her biological sex
and her gender identity (referred to as "gender dysphoria" in the psy-
chological literature8) was centered on her physical body and the meaning
that she gave to her body. Not only did she want to present herself in
everyday life as feminine;9 equally important, she experienced extreme
discomfort with her male genitals.' 0 This discomfort was exacerbated
when she reached puberty and began experiencing muscle and genital de-
velopment and the growth of body hair.
This extreme discomfort ultimately leads most transsexuals to a life-
long desire to conform their bodies, in some way, to their perceived gen-
der identity. Their self-interpretation of their gender identity as female is
intimately bound up with their public presentation as a woman. Accord-
7. One psychologist reports that approximately 85% of her patients had recognized their
gender dysphoria by the time they entered grade school. See BROWN & ROUNSLEY, supra note
1, at 30.
8. The term "gender dysphoria" was coined by Norman Fisk in the early 1970s to refer
to individuals who "were intensely and abidingly uncomfortable in their anatomic and genetic
sex and their assigned gender." Norman Fisk, Gender Dysphoria Syndrome (The How, What
and Why of a Disease), in PROCEEDINGS OF THE SECOND INTERDISCIPLINARY SYMPOSIUM ON
GENDER DYSPHORIA SYNDROME 10 (Donald R. Laub & Patrick Gandy eds., 1973).
The American Psychiatric Association now refers to gender dysphoria as "Gender Identity
Disorder," which is defined as follows:
There are two components of Gender Identity Disorder, both of which must be pres-
ent to make the diagnosis. There must be evidence of a strong and persistent cross-
gender identification, which is the desire to be, or the insistence that one is, of the
other sex (Criterion A). This cross-gender identification must not merely be a desire
for any perceived cultural advantages of being the other sex. There must also be evi-
dence of persistent discomfort about one's assigned sex or a sense of inappropriateness
in the gender role of that sex (Criterion B). The diagnosis is not made if the individ-
ual has a concurrent physical intersex condition. . . (Criterion Q. To make the di-
agnosis, there must be evidence of clinically significant distress or impairment in so-
cial, occupational, or other important areas of functioning (Criterion D).
DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS, DSM-IV 532, 533 (1994).
9. See ALLEN, supra note 3, at 102.
10. See, e.g., LEWINS, supra note 3, at 54. This experience is shared by female-to-male
transsexuals.
The realisation of puberty was one of the most terrible traumas of my whole life, be-
fore or since.... Perhaps it wouldn't happen to me and I would change into a boy?
But at fourteen I started having periods. I was consumed with anger, despair and an-
guish. My body was repugnant, something alien, almost a deformity, although as far
as breast development was concerned, that was never very great-but sufficient to
cause me abhorrence.
Mark Rees, Becoming a Man: The Personal Account of a Female-to-Male Transsexual, in
BLENDING GENDERS, supra note 2, at 27, 28.
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ingly, most transsexuals wear clothing and hairstyles culturally identified
as female. Virtually all transsexuals cross-dress and remove facial and
body hair." Most transsexuals also take female hormones, at least for
some period during their lives, in order to further feminize their male
bodies by softening skin, reducing growth of body hair, broadening the
hips, and enlarging the breasts. 12 Some transsexuals undergo plastic sur-
gery to feminize their facial features, while others undergo vocal cord
surgery to raise the pitch of the voice.
The ultimate step is sex reassignment surgery, a top priority for
many transsexuals who perceive a driving need to align their genitals with
their gender identity. 3 Generally, gender clinics require an individual to
undergo extensive counseling and to live full-time as a woman (the so-
called "real life test") before undertaking such surgery. Many transsexu-
als who do not undergo such surgery lack not the desire but rather the fi-
nancial resources for this extremely expensive operation. 4
Attitudes of post-operative transsexuals are revealing in understand-
ing the self-interpretation of transsexual gender identity. Many post-
operative transsexuals choose to leave the transgendered community after
surgery because they no longer consider themselves to be transgendered.
They now consider themselves to be women. 5 In contrast to female im-
personators, whom transsexuals tend to view as men engaging in gender
parody and play, transsexuals do not view themselves as engaging in Uilu-
sion or impersonation. Rather, they view themselves as expressing their
true feminine gender identity.' 6 Anne Bolin explains that from "the trans-
sexual's standpoint, being a male-to-female transsexual was only a tem-
11. In Frank Lewins' study, 93% of transsexuals were cross-dressing by age 12, before
the onset of puberty. See LEWINS, supra note 3, at 73.
12. See ALLEN, supra note 3, at 106.
13. Transsexual autobiographies often share statements similar to that of Claudine Griggs:
"I dread the surgery; I dread more a life without it." GRIGGS, supra note 3, at 3. Much con-
temporary autobiographical literature views sexual reassignment surgery in the 1990s as "an
unremarkable medical procedure available to any man or woman who desires it." ALLEN, su-
pra note 3, at 102. This is in great contrast to the critical gender theory literature, which con-
stantly asserts that such surgery is dangerous, unsuccessful, and does not psychologically help
an individual. See, e.g., RAYMOND, supra note 2, at 140, 169-71.
14. Sex reassignment surgery is estimated to cost between $6,000 and $15,000. See
ALLEN, supra note 3, at 106. Based on her studies over a fifteen-year span, Anne Bolin has
suggested that, because many transsexuals have in recent years expanded their understanding of
themselves to be "part of a newly emerging transgender community that embraces the possibil-
ity of numerous genders and multiple social identities," in the future there may be a decrease in
the number of persons who sense an urgent need to conform their bodies to their perceived gen-
der identity. Bolin, Transforming Transvestism, supra note 6, at 25.
15. See, e.g., ALLEN, supra note 3, at 110.
16. See Bolin, Transcending and Transgenderings, supra note 2, at 451. There is a sense
in the transsexual community that gay men do not understand the difference between gay female
impersonators and MTF transsexuals. See id.
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porary condition. Transsexualism was an identity to be outgrown as one
eventually became a 'whole' woman. Physical feminization was an im-
portant part of this process of personal and social identity transforma-
tion."17 Moreover, because they identify so deeply with the female gen-
der from an early age, MTF transsexuals (irrespective of whether they
are pre-operative or post-operative) tend to regard themselves as hetero-
sexual if erotically attracted to males, lesbian if attracted to women, and
bisexual if attracted to both. 18
The autobiographical literature makes clear that transsexuals have a
much greater awareness of the intricacies of human gender presentation
than do people who have never experienced gender dysphoria. Trans-
sexuals are keenly aware of what it means to present oneself as a woman,
an issue far more complex than simply wearing women's clothing. Gen-
der presentation is intimately bound up with one's posture, gait, gestures,
and perhaps most importantly, interactions with others in the culture.19
The ideal towards which most MTF transsexuals aim is the feminine fe-
male. Frank Lewin notes that transsexuals want "a body that corre-
sponds to some notion of an ideal image of femininity or... an 'exag-
gerated view of womanliness.'""
An overview of these autobiographies suggests that, in terms of per-
sonal identity, a transsexual's sense of her female gender and its presen-
tation-her gender identity-takes precedence over the individual's bio-
logical sexual identity. This state of affairs is perceived as an
impossibility by critical gender theorists.
B. Critical Gender Theory and Transsexualism
The scholars I have denominated critical gender theorists attack the
assumption that every human being naturally belongs to one of two dis-
crete gender categories (masculine or feminine), which is determined by
biologically-given sexual characteristics (male and female),. l Rather, ac-
cording to critical gender theory, there is no necessary connection be-
tween biological sex and a person's gender presentation. The ways in
which men and women present themselves as gendered individuals are
17. Id. at 457.
18. See id. at 451.
19. See LEwINs, supra note 3, at 110-40 (discussion of the "micro" process of becoming a
woman).
20. Id. at 130. As discussed infra notes 29-30 and accompanying text, this ideal is the
cause of great consternation to many critical gender theorists.
21. See BLENDING GENDERS, supra note 2, at 75.
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social constructs, learned performance, and "a social accomplishment. 22
Biology has no causal influence on gender.
This basic approach to gender poses tremendous problems for the
critical gender theorist confronting the transsexual phenomenon. Given
that gender is socially constructed, a transsexual's autobiographical
statement that he3 (a male in the eyes of the critical gender theorist)
senses himself to have been "born a member of the other gender" makes
little sense. According to critical gender theory, while one may be born a
sexed being,' one is not born gendered. One must learn gender presen-
tation.
Equally troubling to the critical gender theorist is the desire on the
part of many transsexuals to undergo hormonal treatment and sex reas-
signment surgery in order to make his body conform with his perceived
gender identity. For a transsexual to insist on a correspondence between
his gender identity and his sex is to adopt an essentialist view that there is
a necessary tie between a person's sexed body (as male or female) and a
person's gender. Why can't transsexuals simply be happy living in the
female gender role with which they are most comfortable without altering
their biological sex? Why essentialize the "feminine" as necessarily re-
quiring female genitals? In other words, why not simply live as a woman
(understood as gender presentation) with a penis?
Critical gender theorists argue that transsexuals construct their social
identity in a way that merely reproduces the Euro-American dimorphic
vision of gender.' Anne Bolin explains:
From its inception, the transsexual identity sustained the Western para-
digm that the sexes are oppositional and differences in behavior, tem-
perament, character, emotions and sexual orientation are constituted in
biological polarity. This opposition is represented by the genitals, the
symbols of reproductive differences and the primary basis for assigning
biological sex. 26
22. SUzANNE L. KESSLER & WENDY MCKENNA, GENDER: AN
ETHNOMETHODOLOGICAL APPROACH 22 (1977).
23. I am italicizing pronouns in this section to show that, in the eyes of critical gender
theorists, MTF transsexuals remain men. In contrast, from the point of view of the MTF trans-
sexual, she is and has always been a woman.
24. Some critical gender theorists have even questioned the fundamental nature of biologi-
cal sex as dimorphic. See, e.g., JUDITH BUTLER, BODIES THAT MATTER: ON THE
DIscuRsIvE LIMrrs OF "SEx" (1993); ANNE FAUSTO-STERLING, MYTHS OF GENDER (1991);
KESSLER & MCKENNA, supra note 22; THOMAS LAQUEUR, MAKING SEX (1990); MARTINE
ROTHBLATT, THE APARTHEID OF SEx: A MANIFESTO ON THE FREEDOM OF GENDER (1995);
Gilbert Herdt, Introduction: Third Sexes and Third Genders, in THIRD SEx, THIRD GENDER,
supra note 2, at 2 [hereinafter Herdt, Introduction].
25. See, e.g., Bolin, Transcending and Transgenderings, supra note 2, at 452.
26. Id. at 453.
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According to critical gender theory, the transsexual phenomenon re-
suits from a society which first equates sex with genitals and then con-
flates sex (genitals) with gender.27 Transsexuals are unwittingly led to
believe that, in order to express their gender identity as a woman, they
must undergo genital transformation. Anne Bolin explains:
In the Western paradigm women are people with vaginas; therefore, if a
man believes himself to be a woman, he must look the part, down to the
genitals. This paradigm has no room for the social woman with male
genitals as is found elsewhere in the world. Male-to-female transsexual
surgery underscores the Euro-American principles of gender that are
regarded as natural and inevitable: that is, that there are oni,two sexes
and that these are inviolable and are determined by genitalia.
In addition, certain critical gender theorists, including Janice Ray-
mond,29 are extremely troubled by the vision of women and of femininity,
the "feminine woman," to which transsexuals aspire.30 Raymond criti-
cizes this vision as fostering and perpetuating a patriarchal view of
women as sex objects.
Some critical gender theorists view transsexuals as nothing more
than repressed homosexuals who are unable to come to grips with their
sexual orientation and choose radical surgery as a way to reconcile them-
selves with their homosexuality.31 As a result of this particular critique of
transsexualism, post-operative MTF transsexuals have found themselves
rejected by some lesbian and feminist groups, which view them simply as
men.
32
Accordingly, many critical gender theorists consider transsexuals,
not as a potentially revolutionary force in society, but rather as an in-
credibly conservative group whose social demand for sex reassignment
surgery merely reinforces the dimorphic structure of gender in a patriar-
chal society.33
27. For an excellent discussion of the ways in which law conflates sex, gender, and sexual
orientation, see Francisco Valdes, Queers, Sissies, Dykes, and Tomboys: Deconstructing the
Conflation of "Sex," "Gender, " and "Sexual Orientation" in Euro-American Law and Society,
83 CAL. L. REv. 1 (1995).
28. Bolin, Transcending and Transgenderings, supra note 2, at 454. Referencing cases of
intersexed persons, critical gender theorists point out how conceptually difficult it is to assign
sex and gender in the first place, and note that this difficulty leads our dimorphically-gendered
society to simplistically rely solely on genitals. See, e.g., KESSLER & MCKENNA, supra note
22, at 145.
29. See RAYMOND, supra note 2, at 138.
30. See discussion supra note 20 and accompanying text.
31. See RAYMOND, supra note 2, at 84, 87, 122-23.
32. MTF transsexuals were excluded from attending the 1994 Michigan Womyn's Music
Festival based on a "Womyn born Womyn" policy. See CALIFIA, supra note 3, at 227-30.
33. See, e.g., MARGRIT EICHLER, THE DOUBLE STANDARD: A FEMINIST CRITIQUE OF
FEMINIST SOCIAL SCIENCES 88 (1980).
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The attack on the transsexual phenomenon by critical gender theory
is also directed at the medical profession for agreeing to prescribe hor-
monal therapy and to perform sex reassignment surgery.34 Specifically,
the medical profession is accused of inventing, not discovering, transsex-
ualism as a disorder in the following way.35 The medical model defines
transsexualism as a sustained desire on the part of the individual for sex
reassignment surgery. Thus, the solution to the transsexual's problem,
i.e., surgery, is the very way in which the problem is defined in the first
place. The fact that a patient says "I want sex reassignment surgery" is
used as a strong indicator that the individual is a transsexual, and ac-
cordingly, should be allowed to have surgery. In its attack on the medi-
cal profession, critical gender theory attacks transsexuals as deceitful ac-
complices. They are accused of repeating by rote the "correct"
autobiographical story necessary to satisfy the medical gatekeepers who
declare eligibility for surgery, irrespective of whether or not that story
matches the transsexual's own autobiographical history.36
The bottom line for critical gender theory is that the medical model
reinforces and perpetuates the heterosexist understanding that there must
be a congruence between sex and gender. Transsexuals are the victims
of false consciousness, effectively duped by the medical profession into
believing that their gender must be tied to their biology.37 In order to ex-
press their perceived female gender identity, transsexuals are unwittingly
led to believe that they must undergo surgical genital transformation.38
One theorist observes that "[t]ranssexual therapy, legitimised by the ter-
minology of disease, pushes patients towards an alluring world of artifi-
34. See BLENDING GENDERS, supra note 2, at 75-77. Certain critical gender theorists as-
sert that the phenomenon of transsexualism has been defined historically by the development of
two medical technologies in the twentieth century, hormonal therapy and sex-reassignment ther-
apy. See Bolin, Transcending and Transgenderings, supra note 2, at 453. All critical gender
theorists seem to agree that the pivotal moment signifying the birth of the transsexual phenome-
non was the sex reassignment surgery of Christine Jorgensen in 1953. See id. at 455.
35. See Billings & Urban, supra note 2, at 99.
[Transsexualism is a socially constructed reality which exists in and through medical
practice. The problem of transsexual patients does not lie 'in their minds,' as sex-
change proponent John Money puts it. Money's statement typifies medicine's reifica-
tion of transsexualism as a psychological entity. In contrast, we believe transsexual-
ism is a relationship process sustained in medical practice ....
Id.
36. See Bolin, Transcending and Transgenderings, supra note 2, at 457. Bolin points out
that physicians often require a careful screening of individuals seeking sex reassignment surgery
in order to protect themselves from malpractice claims by persons who have regrets after sur-
gery. See id.
37. See id. at 453.
38. Some critical gender theorists criticize the medical professionals who work with trans-
sexuals for ignoring the adverse side effects of both hormonal and surgical treatments. See,
e.g., RAYMOND, supra note 2, at 140, 142-43.
cial vaginas and penises rather than towards self-understanding and sex-
ual politics. Sexual fulfillment and gender-role comfort are portrayed as
commodities, available through medicine." 39
For critical gender theory, transsexualism is not an individual condi-
tion but rather a social and political problem caused by a society obsessed
with a dimorphic vision of sex and gender. What needs correcting is not
the body of the transsexual. Rather, Western society's refusal to allow
men and women to blend gender roles and to express both masculine and
feminine attributes needs to be overturned. Critical gender theorists fa-
vor a "transgendered" approach to sex and gender over a transsexual ap-
proach. Their ideal is the "woman with a penis," an individual born
male who chooses to live his/her life as a woman without undergoing sex
reassignment surgery.' Accordingly, cross-dressers and transvestites
who express their feminine side in their gender presentation, but do not
desire to change their birth sex, are the darlings of critical gender theory
because their gender-blending directly challenges the Western dimorphic
vision of gender. In contrast, transsexuals are considered misled and
confused persons.
C. Observations About Critical Gender Theory's Critique of the
Transsexual Phenomenon
Obviously, my goal in this paper is not to pronounce one vision of
transsexuality right and the other wrong. At a minimum, such an en-
deavor would be meaningless because transsexual autobiographical state-
ments are a "micro" social phenomenon, taking place at the level of indi-
vidual human perception. In contrast, critical gender theory attempts to
analyze a "macro" social phenomenon, exploring how broad patterns of
cultural thought affect social institutions (such as the medical profession)
and individuals. Attempting to judge between transsexual autobiogra-
phies and critical gender theory is to compare apples to oranges. None-
theless, I offer the following observations.
Critical gender theory accurately recognizes an important truth about
the transsexual phenomenon. The advent in the mid-twentieth century of
the medical opportunity for hormonal therapy and sex reassignment sur-
gery offered persons experiencing gender dysphoria a radically new way
to deal with the emotional trauma concerning their gender identity.
Moreover, the appointment of the psychiatric profession as the purveyor
of admission tickets to sex reassignment surgery effectively forced trans-
sexuals to carefully sculpt their identity stories in order to gain admit-
tance to this new-found salvation.
39. Billings & Urban, supra note 2, at 112.
40. See ALLEN, supra note 3, at 95.
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Having accurately exposed this historical phenomenon, critical gen-
der theory has faltered. As evident in the work of Janice Raymond, criti-
cal gender theory has ignored the most basic fact of all-for transsexuals,
gender dysphoria is a central part of their ontological experience, an ex-
perience that begins for many at a very young age. To dismiss transsex-
ualism as part of a "transsexual empire" is to deny the importance of that
experience to the transgendered individual's life story.
The explanation presented by critical gender theory that transsexual
autobiographies are the products of false consciousness is deeply trou-
bling. Social reform in support of any oppressed minority must begin by
paying close attention to the personal perceptions of members of that
community. The stories told by individuals in the community must be
taken seriously. The assertion that the self-perceptions of transsexuals as
embodied in their autobiographical stories are only the result of their
having been duped by the medical profession and by a heterosexist, patri-
archal society smacks of intellectual elitism, and fails to give transsexuals
the respect that is their due. Moreover, the accusation of false con-
sciousness loses much of its impact in light of evidence indicating that
gender dysphoria is first experienced by many transsexuals at an ex-
tremely young age.
The etiology of transsexualism remains highly controversial. Some
theories of gender dysphoria find their roots in a psychological model.41
Other theories suggest that transsexualism has biological origins in pre-
natal or peri-natal sex hormones.42 Still other theories propose etiological
models that combine both psychological and biological causes.43 The one
thing on which virtually everyone who has worked with transsexuals
agrees is that the condition is not subject to "correction" through psy-
chological counseling. 44 Whatever the cause of a transsexual's sense of
gender dysphoria, that condition appears to be highly resistant to change.
41. Most prominent among these is Robert Stoller. See, e.g., 1 ROBERT STOLLER, SEX
AND GENDER: THE DEVELOPMENT OF MASCULINITY AND FEMININITY (1968); 2 ROBERT
STOLLER, SEX AND GENDER: THE TRANSSEXUAL EXPERIMENT (1975); Robert Stoller, A
Contribution to the Study of Gender Identity, 45 INT'L J. OF PSYCHO-ANALYSIS 220 (1964);
Robert Stoller, A Further Contribution to the Study of Gender Identity, 49 INT'L J. OF PSYCHO-
ANALYSIS 364 (1968).
42. See, e.g., Heino F.L. Meyer-Bahlburg, Psychobiologic Research on Homosexuality,
in A QUEER WORLD 285, 288-92 (Martin Duberman ed., 1997).
43. See, e.g., Susan Coates, Gender Identity Disorder in Boys: The Search for a Consti-
tutional Factor, in A QUEER WORLD, supra note 42, at 108-33 (suggesting that gender identity
disorder in boys results from a constitutional affective disorder combined with a traumatic expe-
rience of maternal/childhood interaction).
44. See, e.g., Walter 0. Bockting, Transgender Coming Out: Implications for the Clini-
cal Management of Gender Dysphoria, in GENDER BLENDING, supra note 2, at 48-52.
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Accordingly, though of continuing interest to scientists studying hu-
man sexuality, the reasons why a person experiences gender dysphoria
must recede into the background when considering political and social
goals. Instead of exploring ways to cure transgendered people or to en-
lighten them as to their false consciousness, those concerned with pro-
tecting the rights of and fostering the lives of transsexual persons must
explore new ways in which these individuals can understand and negoti-
ate the immutable reality of their psychological lives. An important goal
must be to discover a range of alternatives to which transsexuals can turn
to assist them in coping with the cognitive dissonance experienced be-
tween their gender identity and their bodies. In pursuing this goal, it is
simply wrong to advocate the outright banning of sex reassignment sur-
gery, as would seem to be the position of many critical gender theorists.
After close consultation with caring professionals, surgery may in fact be
the most appropriate choice for some individuals attempting to deal with
severe gender dysphoria.45 Another choice might be hormonal therapy
without genital surgery. Yet another choice might be for the transgen-
dered individual to live full-time as a member of the opposite gender,
without any medical intervention whatsoever. This choice would fulfill
the critical gender theorist's ideal of a biological male living as a "woman
with a penis." As Anne Bolin notes:
[Tihe recently emerging transgendered identity offers an account of
gender as a social product. The transgenderist may or may not
feminize: some appear androgynous and others pass. The possible
permutations within transgenderism are innumerable and lay bare the
point that gender is not biology but is socially produced. The
transgenderist harbors great potential either to deactivate gender or to
create in the future the possibility of "supernumerary" genders as social
categories no longer based on biology.46
What is most important is that we not lose sight of the autobio-
graphical experiences of transgendered persons. Once an array of alter-
natives for transgendered identity is recognized and presented, the auton-
omy of a transgendered person to choose that alternative which is best for
him/her must be rigorously respected. The suggestion of some critical
gender theorists that transsexuals should focus on changing social atti-
tudes toward gender, instead of focusing on changing their bodies, insen-
45. Within the transsexual community itself, the extent to which the medical profession
should continue to serve as the gatekeeper to surgery (as opposed to giving decision-making
autonomy to each individual transsexual) is a highly controversial issue. See, e.g., Dallas
Denny & Jan Roberts, Results of a Questionnaire on the Standards of Care of the Hary Benja-
min International Gender Dysphoria Association, in GENDER BLENDING, supra note 2, at 320-
36.
46. Bolin, Transforming Transvestism, supra note 6, 30-31.
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sitively discounts the lived experience of transsexuals and thus ignores
the need to foster and improve that experience.
H. Reconciling Transsexual Voices and Critical Gender
Theory: Alternative Visions of Sex, Gender, and Gender Identity
Any attempt to reconcile transsexual voices and critical gender the-
ory can most profitably be founded in an important common commitment
held by both groups. Transsexuals and critical gender theorists alike
challenge the notion deeply ingrained in Euro-American culture that there
is an essential link between an individual's biological sex at birth and that
individual's gender presentation throughout life. Therefore, both groups
strongly oppose the view that individuals born as biological males must
display masculine gender attributes and individuals born as biological fe-
males must display feminine gender attributes.
Given this common commitment, I want to explore visions of sex,
gender, and gender identity which present alternatives to Euro-American
dimorphism. In this section, I first examine the serious constraints that a
sexually dimorphic culture imposes on an individual who may experience
her gender identity as not coinciding with her biological sex. I then ex-
plore two alternative ways in which sex and gender can be conceptual-
ized. The first vision I explore is one referred to as "sexual continuism"
by Martine Rothblatt in her book, The Apartheid of Sex.47 The second vi-
sion I explore is one which views members of certain sex/gender minori-
ties as members of a third sex/gender. This vision has a distinguished
history in other cultures, including the two-spirit tradition (berdache)
among Native American persons and the hijras tradition in India. Based
on this vision, I propose the introduction of a third sex/gender category
into Euro-American culture. In Part I, I contrast and compare Roth-
blatt's vision of sexual continuism with the vision of a third sex/gender,
in order to evaluate which has the greater potential to bridge the gap be-
tween transsexual voices and critical gender theory.
A. The Constraints on Gender Identity Imposed by a Sexually Dimorphic
Culture
Though uncertainties exist in so many areas concerning gender iden-
tity, this much we seem to know: some individuals from a very early age
47. RoTHBLATr, supra note 24, at 22. See also KESSLER & MCKENNA, supra note 22, at
163.
experience gender dysphoria, "an amorphous feeling of being different
quite early in life." 4 Milton Diamond explains:
In their own minds there is no doubt they are of the opposite sex and
should be reared accordingly. They become convinced so by everyday
life events that they feel do not resonate well with their own image of
who they are. They want to live life transformed so their anatomy fits
their conviction and mental image of self.
49
Whatever its etiology, there is no doubting this sense of gender dys-
phoria experienced by transgendered people. Even Gilbert Herdt, a
scholar who has forcefully shown the impact of culture on sexual orien-
tation,50 admits that there is in all likelihood a biological component to
gender identity:
Gender identity is not entirely a social construction, and sexual varia-
tions are not merely illusions of culture. The felt experiences of having
a certain body, including the desires and strivings of the person socially
identified with that body, combine to create a powerful ontology across
the course of life. Surely, some elements of sex/gender development
are internally motivated or hormonally time loaded in ways that can in-
fluence the outcome of such a life.51
So, accepting the reality of a child's sense of gender dysphoria, what
is it for a biological male to "know" that she actually was meant to be a
female? It is doubtful that one is born with some innate sense that
"though I have a penis, I was meant to have a vagina." Instead, a trans-
gendered person's dysphoria is self-interpreted in terms and concepts
learned from the surrounding culture. In Euro-American culture, which
is highly sexually dimorphic, the dysphoric individual will be inclined to
self-interpret her experience in terms that are bipolar-male or female. If
48. Milton Diamond, Self-Testing: A Check on Sexual Identity and Other Levels of Sexu-
ality, in GENDER BLENDING, supra note 2, at 103, 105.
49. Id. Diamond further explains:
Early in life, the transsexual becomes aware that society is reacting to her or him in a
manner felt as inappropriate. In some subtle way transsexuals come to realize they
would be more comfortable treated as are their opposite-sexed siblings or peers. The
developing... [transsexual] realizes he or she is being treated not in accordance with
internal feelings but rather in accordance with external anatomy....
[S]uch individuals recount lives in which they had manifested or recognized a disposi-
tion toward cross-gender lifestyle events and behaviors. Their day-to-day social life.
. told them their internal signals were not synchronized with the external ones and
their internal signals won out. They typically recount many incidents where sex-of-
birth appropriate behaviors were felt to be or were actually impossible or difficult to
manage .... And, quite often, these feelings have existed from preschool days.
Id. at 104-05.
50. See generally GILBERT HERDT, SAME SEX, DIFFERENT CULTURES: GAYS AND
LESBIANS ACROSS CULTURES (1997).
51. Gilbert Herdt, Mistaken Sex, in THImD SEX, THIRD GENDER, supra note 2, at 419,
444-45 [hereinafter Herdt, Mistaken Sex].
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the individual experiences discomfort with male identity, the only alter-
native is to conclude that she must be the opposite-female. This is rein-
forced by Western culture's essentializing a necessary tie between, on the
one hand, those somatic features which serve as the basis for ascribing
sex, and on the other hand, the gendered ways in which we are taught to
present ourselves in everyday life.
52
Given this cultural setting, it is not surprising that individuals expe-
riencing dysphoria conclude that it is not enough to present themselves in
gendered ways culturally understood as belonging to the opposite sex.
One is not truly a woman unless one is morphologically a woman. Thus,
many transsexuals believe that they must "go all the way" and change
their bodies by undergoing sex reassignment surgery. In a culturally di-
morphic society, if you are not one sex (which is what a transsexual's
dysphoria tells him/her), you must be the other. Gender identity is expe-
rienced as immutable. Accordingly, one must change that which is mu-
table given modern technology-one's biological morphology.53
Western culture's dimorphic vision of sex and gender has proven
destructive to transgendered people, in particular to transsexuals. As
critical gender theory has suggested, that vision has made it extremely
difficult for transsexual persons to conceptualize their own identities in
any way other than as cross-gendered. If a transsexual biological male
does not perceive him/herself to be a man, she/he must be a woman. 54
Dimorphism is not, however, the only vision of sex and gender
available. There are cultures which conceptualize three or more
sex/genders. Moreover, among certain of these cultures, sex/gender is
not necessarily equated with biology. Within such a cultural setting, the
response to gender dysphoria might be very different. Though one expe-
riences severe discomfort with the way in which one is gendered by soci-
52. See KESSLER & MCKENNA, supra note 22, at 153-55 (describing how the ascription of
sex is based largely on genitals in Western society).
53. The two groups that most seriously defy the Euro-American cultural assumption that
biological sex and gender identity go hand in hand are intersexed persons and transsexuals. In-
tersexed people have an advantage over transsexuals in terms of their acceptance and under-
standing by society. In many cases of intersexed persons, the automatic assumption of
male=masculine, female=feminine is short-circuited at birth, because the visible features on
which the ascription of sexuality is based, genitals, defy common sense assumptions as to the
nature of the world. See, e.g., Clifford Geertz, Common Sense as a Cultural System, in LOCAL
KNOWLEDGE 73, 80-84 (1983) (Doctors and parents are stopped still in their tracks when faced
with ambiguous sex organs, and are forced to confront the possibility that the automatic equa-
tion of sex=gender may not be true in all cases).
54. As the text makes clear, attempting to use language in a dimorphic culture to write
about non-dimorphic cultural possibilities is, in a word, maddening. One obviously needs a
pronoun that does not predetermine that sex/gender is dimorphic. The use of the neuter pro-
noun, "it," is extremely dehumanizing, and accordingly, counterproductive to the enterprise in
which I am involved-trying to normalize and gain respect for transgendered persons.
ety, if the social understandings of sex/gender are less closely tied to
one's biological features, then one might have available ways to alleviate
one's dysphoria without turning to genital surgery. The possibility of
viewing transsexuals as a third sex/gender is considered in greater detail
below.
B. Sexual Continuism
In searching for an alternative to sexual dimorphism, let's begin with
Martine Rothblatt's vision of "sexual continuism." According to Roth-
blatt, dividing persons into dimorphic categories of "male" and "female"
is as arbitrary a way to distinguish among people as dividing persons into
racial categories.56 She describes this division of people into two sexes as
the "apartheid of sex." Rothblatt sees the apartheid of sex as based on
the dimorphic gender paradigm because
[i]t claims that this absolute division [of male and female] arises from
sex-differentiated levels of hormones released prenatally, which in turn
create not only two different reproductive systems, but also two differ-
ent mental natures. From its ancient genesis, the old gender paradigm
has been used to enforce the superiority of one apparent sex over the
other and as a framework for research to prove one sex has a different
nature from the other.57
Rothblatt proposes an alternative vision of sex which she calls "sex-
ual continuism." This vision "posits that humanity is composed of a
continuous blend of sexual identity, far beyond any simplistic male or
female categorization. "58 Sexual continuism "predicts that sexual iden-
tity, like other aspects of personality, arises from a confluence of factors
not solely hormonal or environmental in origin. "5
Rothblatt bases sexual continuism on a review of research in sociol-
ogy, psychology, and neurology. She asserts that what seems to be a
natural biological distinction between male and female is not so clear.
Rothblatt looks to the fact that approximately four percent of the popula-
tion displays intersexed attributes, either genitally, gonadally, or chromo-
somally.60 Moreover, she looks to the fact that all individuals are hor-
monally a mix of what have been viewed traditionally as male hormones
55. See infra Parts H.C, III.B.
56. See ROTHBLATT, supra note 24, at 19.
57. Id. at 102.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Rothblatt relies on the research of Anne Fausto-Sterling. See id. at 9. See, e.g.,
Anne Fausto-Sterling, The Five Sexes-Why Male and Female Are Not Enough, THE SCIENCES,
Mar./Apr. 1993, at 20.
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(testosterone) and female hormones (estrogen).61 In addition, Rothblatt
challenges evidence suggesting that there is any difference between men's
brains and women's brains (either structurally or functionally). In terms
of physical and mental performance, Rothblatt points out that there is a
tremendous overlap between persons viewed as men and women. Fi-
nally, as technology begins to free human reproduction from the highly
specific requirements of a male parent and a female parent, she claims
that human reproduction can no longer serve as a justification for distin-
guishing males from females. "The new paradigm [of sexual continuism]
claims that reproductive systems are not strictly personal, but are socio-
technical and are accessible by all persons regardless of genitalia. "'
Given her vision of a continuum of sex, Rothblatt urges that biologi-
cal sex should no longer have any tie to the social, economic, or legal
spheres of life.' Instead, she states that
[liabeling people as male or female, upon birth, exalts biology over so-
ciology. Instead, the new feminist principles inspire us to permit all
people to self-identify their sexual status along a broad continuum of
possibilities and to create such cultures of gender as human ingenuity
may develop. 64
Thus, Rothblatt believes that a range of gender presentations should
be available to all persons. She argues that there is in fact a "continuous
blend of sexual identity, far beyond any simplistic male or female catego-
rization."' According to Rothblatt's vision, genitals become irrelevant as
a mode of determining either sex or gender.
Rothblatt's critique of the dimorphic paradigm of sex is directly in-
tended to support the transgendered movement.66 "Transgenderism makes
manifest the continuum nature of sex types because even if a sex type
61. See ROTHBLATr, supra note 24, at 8. She further points out that, as one ages, the
testosterone and estrogen levels of men and women converge. See id.
62. Id. at 102.
63. See id. at 13.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 102.
66. Rothblatt describes herself as a "transperson." See id. at 159. Having been born
male, and having married a woman, she states:
[A] few years ago, I decided to convert and become a kind of transgendered woman.
Why? Because there was a lot more to my soul than the masculine persona I had be-
come. There was a woman who needed to be expressed....
Today my spice of more than ten years and I have a wonderful unisexual lesbian
marriage. In other words, she fell in love with my soul, not my sex. The trans-
gender life-style has made our life more interesting and enabled our personalities to
grow.
Id. at 159-60.
was real at birth, it can now be changed at will during one's life."67 She
believes that rather than being assigned to one of two sexes at birth, and
in turn being tracked toward one set of expected gender behaviors, indi-
viduals should be allowed to freely find their place on the continuum of
sex as they move through life.6"
C. The Third Sex/Third Gender
Unlike Rothblatt's theory, which posits a unity of human sexuality
along a single continuum, a different alternative to sexual dimorphism
posits a multiplicity of sexuality-the notion of a third sex/gender.
(1) Examples from Other Cultures
Under the influence of Darwinian scholarship,69 during the past
century social scientists have obsessively focused on the reproductive as-
pects of human sexuality. Therefore, cultural variations which suggest a
third sex/gender have been downplayed in anthropological and other
studies. Nonetheless, the existence of gender-nonconforming individuals
is fairly universal among all cultures.7' Cultures currently exist, and have
existed throughout history, that have embraced the vision of a third
sex/gender.7 In order to illustrate this possibility, I will explore briefly
three examples of cultures that negotiate a third sex/gender for certain in-
67. Id. at 16.
68. See id. at 18.
69. See generally Gilbert Herdt, Third Genders, Third Sexes, in A QUEER WORLD, supra
note 42, at 100 [hereinafter Herdt, Third Genders].
70. See id. at 102. Herdt makes clear that, in modem times, there have been strong cul-
tural and moral pressures for people to conform to a dimorphic vision of sex/gender. Accord-
ingly, those who defy such a vision tend to remain hidden at the margins, often observed only
from scholarly investigations into the gendered aspects of a particular society:
We are dealing with multiple cultural and historical worlds, in which persons of di-
vergent sexual and gendered nature exist on the margins of society. They pass as
normal to remain hidden from the official ideology and everyday commerce of social
life. For this reason, they may, upon discovery, become icons in history and popular
culture, sanctioning normal male/female dimorphism, a kind of betrayed matter out of
place, which symbolizes boundary blurring, the anomalous, the unclean, the tainted,
the morally inept or corrupt, the monsters of the cultural imagination of the Renais-
sance, and the vampires of Anne Rice novels.
Id. at 104.
71. Any in-depth discussion of cultures which conceptualize third sexes and third genders
is far beyond the scope of this paper. The best overview of such cultures is presented in THIRD
SEX, THIRD GENDER, supra note 2.
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dividuals: the Native American berdache, the Indian hijras, and the
Sambian kwolu-aatmwol. 7
Before proceeding, however, I offer an observation about the usage
of the very terms "sex" and "gender." The distinction between sex and
gender, distinguishing body from culture, is itself culturally bound and
socially constructed. It is a distinction that can arise only in a culture that
views the body (in particular, genitals) as the most significant basis for
categorizing the sexualized aspects of human life. 3 In other cultures
where morphology is less important to the understanding and classifica-
tions of gendered life, the dimorphic distinction between sex and gender
blurs. Accordingly, because I am examining cultures which challenge a
dimorphic vision of human gendered life by introducing a third category,
I will hereinafter often refer to "sex/gender." Once one posits the exis-
tence of a third sex/gender category, the importance of biological attrib-
utes (e.g., genitals) to fundamental categorization of individuals wanes in
significance.74
72. Gilbert Herdt has suggested that, given our cultural understandings, distinctions can be
drawn between societies that conceptualize a third gender from those that conceptualize a third
sex. Third genders are conceptualized largely on the basis of cultural characteristics, while
third sexes are conceptualized on the basis of some more material feature about a person's body
(features often associated with intersexed persons, i.e., a small penis or a large clitoris). See
Herdt, Third Genders, supra note 69, at 100. Moreover, Herdt raises important questions
about whether the instances in which we find societies conceptualizing third sexes or third gen-
ders are "the product of ontology, of a sense of being different that identifies with the cate-
gory," or a product of "social and sexual pressures that produce normative dimorphic hierar-
chies." Id. at 106-07.
73. For an application of this insight to law, see Katherine M. Franke, The Central Mis-
take of Sex Discrimination Law: The Disaggregation of Sex From Gender, 144 U. PA. L. REV.
1(1995).
74. Will Roscoe notes:
Gender categories often draw on perceptions of anatomical and physiological differ-
ences between bodies, but these perceptions are always mediated by cultural catego-
ries and meanings. Nor can we assume the relative importance of these perceptions in
the overall definition of personhood in a given social context, or that these differences
will be interpreted as dichotomous and fixed, or that they will be viewed as behavioral
or social determinants (as opposed to, for example, a belief that behaviour might de-
termine anatomy)....
... IThe presence of multiple genders does not require belief in the existence of
three or more physical sexes but, minimally, a view of physical differences as un-
fixed, or insufficient on their own to establish gender, or simply less important than
individual and social factors, such as occupational preference, behavior and tempera-
ment, religious experiences, and so forth.
Will Roscoe, Gender Diversity in Native North America: Notes Toward a Unified Analysis, in
QUEER WORLD, supra note 42, at 68.
a. The Native American Berdache
Perhaps the best-known example of a third sex/gender category is
the Native American "two-spirit" people, formerly known as "ber-
dache."' Male berdaches have been documented in nearly 150 Native
North American societies. In approximately half of these groups, a
similar status has been noted for females who undertook a man's life-
style.76 Berdaches are characterized by gender nonconformity in various
aspects of their lives. Will Roscoe has suggested that the most appropri-
ate way to understand the berdache is as part of a third sex/gender cate-
gory. 7 Three key features appear to have characterized this unique
sex/gender status: productive specialization (crafts and domestic work
for male berdaches; warfare, hunting, and leadership roles in the case of
female berdaches); supernatural sanction (in the form of an authoriza-
tion and/or bestowal of powers); and gender variation.7"
Instead of simply viewing the berdaches as an example of dimorphic
gender-crossing, anthropologists and historians have recently "begun to
argue that berdaches in fact occupied a third gender role, or, in the case
of tribes with both male and female berdaches, and distinct terms for
each, third and fourth genders."79 Roscoe explains:
On the one hand, it easily can be shown that a dual gender model fails
to account for many of the behaviors and attributes reported for ber-
daches-for example, berdaches who did not cross-dress or attempt to
mimic the behavior of the "opposite" and those who engaged in a com-
75. See Terry N. Tafoya, Native Two-Spirit People, in TEXTBOOK OF HOMOSEXUALITY
AND MENTAL HEALTH 603 (Robert P. Cabaj & Terry S. Stein eds., 1996):
Historically, the most common term used to describe the two-spirit person was
"Berdache." In a 1994 official statement to the American Anthropological Associa-
tion, a group of Native and non-Native anthropologists and other scholars formally
asked authors of introductory textbooks to update the terminology "Berdache" to
"two-spirit" and to recommend that when the archaic term must be used for historical
purposes, it should be written as "Berdache" [sic] ....
In many ways "Berdache" is a misleading term. It is originally derived from a
mid-Eastern term for "male sex slave," or catamite, a category brought back during
the time of the Crusades by some Europeans.... When French fur traders, mission-
aries, and explorers encountered Native people who were "different," they often used
the word "Berdache" to refer to them.
Id. at 605-06 ([sic] in original).
76. See Roscoe, supra note 74, at 65.
77. As Pat Califia has pointed out, influenced by a dimorphic vision of sex/gender, certain
historians have attempted to view the berdaches as examples of homosexuals in non-Western
culture. See CALIFIA, supra note 3, at 123-46 (discussing work of, among others, Jonathan Katz
in GAY AMERICAN HIsTORY (1976)).
78. See Roscoe, supra note 74, at 65. In the case of gender variation, while cross-
dressing was the most common and visible marker, it has proven a more variable and less reli-
able indicator of berdache status than previously assumed. See id.
79. Id. at 66.
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bination of female, male, and berdache-specific pursuits. On the other
hand, the consistent use of distinct terms to refer to berdaches, a prac-
tice that prevented their conceptual assimilation to an "opposite" sex, is
positive evidence that berdache status was viewed as a separate cate-
gory.
80
b. The Indian Hijras
Another example of a third sex/gender category are the hijras of In-
dia. Hijras are "a religious community of men who dress and act like
women and whose culture centers on the worship of Bahuchara Mara,"
one of many goddesses worshipped throughout India.8 As part of this
worship, hijras undergo ritual surgery involving the removal of their
genitals. This surgery defines the hijras as neither men nor women, but
rather promotes the hijras to a sacred place in Indian culture. 82 They are
believed to have supernatural powers, which entitle them to perform spe-
cial rituals after the birth of a male child and during weddings. In both
contexts, these ritual performances are connected to fertility. 83
While Hindu culture in general ascribes to strict gender roles, be-
lieving men and women to have different sexual natures and different
roles to perform in society, that culture also believes that sex/ gender is
mutable and alterable. Accordingly, the "conceptualization of Hijras as
neither man nor woman has nothing to do with male homosexuality.
Rather it is based on the model of the hermaphrodite, a biologically inter-
sexed person."84 In fact, the understanding of the hijras as an alternative,
third sex is firmly based in age-old Indian culture. "The interchange of
male and female qualities, transformations of sex and gender and alterna-
80. Id. at 66-67.
81. See Serena Nanda, The Hijras of India, in A QUEER WORLD, supra note 42, at 82
[hereinafter Nanda, The Hifras of India]. See also Serena Nanda, Hjras: An Alternative Sex
and Gender Role in India, in THIRD Sax, THiRD GENDER, supra note 2, at 373 [hereinafter
Nanda, Hijras: An Alternative Sex].
82. See Nanda, The Hijras of India, supra note 81, at 82.
83. See id.
84. Id. at 83. Nanda further explains:
The popular understanding of the hijra as an alternative sex and gender role is based
on the model of the hermaphrodite, a person biologically intersexed .... The word
hijra is a masculine noun, most widely translated into English as either "eunuch" or
"hermaphrodite (intersexed)." Both these glosses emphasize sexual impotence, which
is understood in India to mean a physical defect impairing the male sexual function,
both in intercourse (in the inserter role) and in reproductive ability .... It is widely
believed in India that a man who has continued sexual relations in the receiver role
will lose sexual vitality in his genitals, and become impotent. It is sexual impotence
(with women), then, and not sexual relations with men that defines the potential hijra.
Nanda, Hijras: An Alternative Sex, supra note 81, at 380 (emphasis in original).
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ive sex and gender roles, both among deities and humans, are meaning-
ful and positive themes in Hindu mythology, ritual and art."8 5
c. The Sambian Kwolu-aatmwol
A final example of a culture's conceptualizing a third sex/gender is
found in the Sambian society in New Guinea, which identifies certain in-
dividuals as kwolu-aatmwol. The term kwolu-aatmwol best translates as
"a female thing changing into a male thing." 8 These are persons who
would be diagnosed by Western medicine as having an intersexed condi-
tion known as "five alpha reductase hermaphrodism." 87 They are born
with ambiguous female-appearing genitals at birth. At puberty, the indi-
vidual begins developing into a "normal" male, with the growth of body
hair and male musculature. Such individuals are assigned to this third
sex/gender category, kwolu-aatmwol, often from the time of birth. 8
Sambian culture regards such an individual as "[a] sad and mysterious
quirk of nature," though some have gone on to distinguish themselves as
a shaman or war leader.89
In Sambian culture, "[b]iological maleness is distinct from the mere
possession of male genitalia."' One achieves maleness by undergoing a
series of puberty initiations over a period of years. Gilbert Herdt posits
that kwolu-aatmwol occupy a third sex/gender position in Sambian cul-
ture because they are not allowed to undergo the final third stage of such
initiation, an otherwise universal event for all other males. Moreover,
they appear to be socialized to be less aggressive and assertive and more
nurturing and deferential than other males. 9' Herdt notes that the "pres-
ence of a third-sex category, with sex reassignment at birth and some dif-
ferences in growing up, serves to mediate gender dimorphism, providing
a different, perhaps anomalous or residual if not fuzzy set of responses to
their bodies and, within themselves, to their own sense of their identi-
ties. "92
From this brief overview, one can see that the two sex/gender sys-
tem of Western culture that appears to have arisen in the eighteenth and
85. Id. at 375.
86. THIRD SEX, THIRD GENDER, supra note 2, at 16.
87. Herdt, Third Genders, supra note 69, at 101.
88. Herdt points out that, on occasion, these intersexed individuals are assigned and raised
as female. "Yet because the phenomenon has existed for generations and the midwives and
mothers go to some lengths to examine the infant's body for signs of the kwolu-aafmwol, it is
unlikely that a mistake in sex assignment will occur, and only a few instances of such a mis-
taken assignment... are historically known." Herdt, Mistaken Sex, supra note 51, at 436.
89. Id. at 436.
90. Id. at 434.
91. See id. at 439.
92. Id. at 442.
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nineteenth centuries is by no means inevitable.' Instances in other cul-
tures of multiple sex/genders have been systematically distorted or ig-
nored by Western anthropologists and historians studying these socie-
ties."
(2) A Proposed Third Sex/Gender Category for Euro-American Culture-
"Other"
Drawing from the examples from Native American, Indian, and
Sambian cultures, I propose that we begin to conceptualize a third
sex/gender category for Euro-American culture, which I will tentatively
term "Other." In doing so, I take my cue from several sources. First,
Marjorie Garber, in her book Vested Interests, argues that cross-dressers
have always been a necessary part of any gendered culture, serving to
reinforce sex/gender categories by marking the outer limits and providing
a foil against which social ideas of gender can be propagated. ' She
states:
[O]ne of the most consistent and effective functions of the transvestite in
culture is to indicate the place of what I call "category crisis," dis-
rupting and calling attention to cultural, social, or aesthetic dissonances
By "category crisis" I mean a failure of definitional distinction, a
borderline that becomes permeable, that permits of border crossings
from one (apparently distinct) category to another.
96
Similarly, the category "Other" is also meant to provoke a category
crisis. It is not meant to describe any "natural" type, and thus does not
refer to any specific biological, psychological, or social attributes of an
individual. Rather, it is a classification, freely assumed by an individual,
which brings to the fore the ambiguities inherent in the dimorphic divi-
sion of humans into the seemingly natural categories of male and female.
The restroom labeled "Other" which I discuss below is the institutional
component meant to assist the conceptual sex/gender category, "Other,"
in challenging sexual dimorphism.
I also take my cue in proposing a new sex/gender category from the
works of Kate Bornstein and Anne Bolin. In Gender Outlaw,' Bornstein
93. See generally LAQUEUR, supra note 24. Laqueur argues that, prior to the Enlighten-
ment, people considered themselves as belonging to only one sex. Females were perceived as
being a lesser form of males. Female genitals were scientifically viewed as male genitals that
were simply reversed and on the inside of the body.
94. See Herdt, Third Genders, supra note 69, at 102.
95. See generally MARJORIE GARBER, VESTED INTERESTS: CROSS-DRESSING &
CULTURAL ANXIETY (1992).
96. Id. at 16.
97. BORNSTEIN, supra note 3.
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points out that the strict gender codes of our dimorphic culture not only
oppress transgendered people, but gay and lesbian people as well. She
explains:
Assuming that gay men and lesbians are more consciously excluded by
the culture for violations of gender codes (which are visible in the daily
life of the culture) than for actual sexual practices (which usually hap-
pen behind closed doors and in private spaces), then lesbians and gay
men actually share the same stigma with "transgendered" people: the
stigma of crimes against gender....
So let's reclaim the word "transgendered" so as to be more inclusive.
Let's let it mean "transgressively gendered." Then, we have a group of
people who break the rules, codes, and shackles of gender.
98
Anne Bolin similarly encourages the use of the model of a third
sex/gender as a way of broadening the political movement of those who
challenge dimorphic visions of sex:
By being Other and seeking roots with Otherness, transgendered people
and gay men and women can transform their status momentarily or
more deeply. By using the berdache as a model, the transgender com-
munity and homosexual community become active participants in re-
shaping their culture and in finding affiliation where division existed. 99
Let me make clear what I am not proposing by the vision of a new
sex/gender category, "Other." I am not suggesting that we view all
transsexual persons, or transgendered persons, or any other group of per-
sons, as the unique membership of a third sex/gender. The last thing I
wish to advocate is a simplistic replacement of our society's rigid dimor-
phic vision of sex/gender with an equally rigid trimorphic vision."00
Rather, the category "Other" is broadly and inclusively conceived,
as potentially excluding no one. So who exactly is a member of the
sex/gender category, "Other"? The determination as to whether one is a
member of the category has nothing to do with biology, desire, or gender
98. Id. at 134-35. Recent legal scholarship strongly supports Bornstein's assertion that
discrimination against lesbians and gay men relates far less to their sexual practices and more to
their defiance of society's gender norms. See Mary Anne C. Case, Disaggregating Gender
from Sex and Sexual Orientation: The Effeminate Man in the Law and Feminist Jurisprudence,
105 YALE L.J. 1 (1995); Katherine M. Franke, What's Wrong with Sexual Harassment, 49
STAN. L. REv. 691 (1997). See also Doe v. City of Belleville, 119 F.3d 563, 580 (7th Cir.
1997) (holding that same-sex sexual harassment is actionable under Title VII and that "Title VII
does not permit an employee to be treated adversely because his or her appearance or conduct
does not conform to stereotypical gender roles"), petition for cert. filed, 66 U.S.L.W. 3308
(U.S. Oct. 15, 1997)(No. 97-669).
99. Bolin, Transcending and Transgenderings, supra note 2, at 477.
100. Gilbert Herdt observes, "IT]he code of thirdness should not be taken literally to mean
that in all times and places, there are only three categories possible for human life. We would
want to entertain the possibility of multiple categories in human lives." Herdt, Third Genders,
supra note 69, at 105.
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presentation. It is a matter of personal choice. It is an identity category
which an individual can assume to challenge the destructive history
caused by our culture's adoption of a dimorphic sex/gender division.
Identifying oneself as "Other" is a conscious choice by an individual to
oppose the male/female, masculine/feminine dichotomies, and the op-
pressions that result from those dichotomies.
Accordingly, irrespective of one's genitals, chromosomes, sexual
orientation, gender presentation, or gender identity, any individual may
opt to self-identify as "Other." By so doing, that individual makes a
statement of solidarity with other persons who object to the insidious na-
ture of Euro-American sexual dimorphism. "Other," rather than recog-
nizing a new "natural" third sex/gender category, serves as a queer sex,
gender-blending sex, transgendered-sex category. To borrow from Anne
Bolin, the category "Other" is part of the
process of creating not just a third gender but the possibility of numer-
ous genders and multiple social identities. As such, [Other] chal-
lenge[s] the dominant American gender paradigm with its emphasis on
reproduction and the biological sexual body as the sine qua non of gen-
der identity and role. 101
MII. Evaluation of the Two Alternative Visions
Which of these alternative visions of sex, gender, and gender iden-
tity-sexual continuism or a third sex/gender-offers the greatest promise
of providing common conceptual ground on which critical gender theo-
rists and transsexuals can ally in the struggle for transsexual rights? In
this section, I will evaluate these alternative visions along two parame-
ters."° First, is the alternative vision of sex/gender attractive to both
101. Bolin, Transcending and Transgenderings, supra note 2, at 477.
102. Dallas Denny has suggested a more complex, multi-factored approach to evaluating
alternative visions of sex and gender as they apply to transgendered and transsexual persons:
Some Criteria by Which to Evaluate Various Models of Transgender and Transexual
Behavior
a How has the model impacted the way transgendered and transexual persons see
themselves and the way they are viewed by others?
* Does the model treat the transgendered and transexual individual with self-respect
and dignity?
* Does the model maximize the amount of choice of the transgendered and transex-
ual individual (allow the individual to set his or her own pace, to participate in deci-
sions to change/not change the body, and to decide upon particular life goals)?
" Does the model require the individual to surrender autonomy?
* Does the model build a sense of transgendered and transexual persons as healthy
and productive, or does it pre-suppose abnormality and pathology?
* Does the model allow a healthy range of personal styles, as opposed to promoting
gender stereotypes?
transsexuals and to critical gender theorists? Second, can the vision
translate into practical social policy?
In testing each vision for its practicability, I use the heuristic device
of the public restroom. In so doing, I do not intend in any way to trivi-
alize issues of transsexual rights. The choice of public restrooms is in
fact the source of considerable anguish for transsexuals (especially in the
workplace). As Brown and Rounsley point out:
Both practicality and logic dictate that someone dressed as a woman
does not belong in the men's room-just as someone dressed as a man
does not belong in the ladies' room. And yet, which bathroom the
transsexual erployee should use often becomes an area of concern in
many compames.
Moreover, public restrooms are a social institution in our society which
blatantly reinforce a dimorphic vision of sex/gender. Accordingly, the
treatment given by each alternative vision to this omnipresent social in-
stitution indicates the power of that vision to precipitate social change
which potentially can benefit all sexual minorities.
A. Evaluating Sexual Continuism-the Unisex Bathroom
Though Rothblatt's theory of sexual continuism should prove quite
attractive to critical gender theorists, it is less clear that transsexuals
would find it a compelling alternative to sexual dimorphism. Contempo-
rary critical gender theory has moved beyond the early feminist critique
0 Does the model provide a variety of outcome choices, including sex reassign-
ment, genital surgery, hormonal therapy, androgyny, transgenderism, and remaining
in the original gender role?
* Does the model provide procedural safeguards for medical procedures and treat-
ment?
0 Does the model provide continuity from early "coming-out" stages through cop-
ing with circumstances of the new life?
* Does the model provide the individual with opportunities to explore alternative
gender roles before taking irrevocable steps? Does it allow "fall-back" positions
when a step proves undesirable?
0 Does the model provide for a hierarchy of treatment, with less aversive and intru-
sive methods considered before more aversive and intrusive methods are tried?
* Does the model provide for peer support?
* What are the relative costs associated with the model?
* What have been the outcomes of past applications of the model?
Dallas Denny, Transgender: Some Historical, Cross-Cultural, and Contemporary Models and
Methods of Coping and Treatment, in GENDER BLENDING, supra note 2, at 34.
As I suggest below, to the extent that the model of a third sex/gender allows a transgen-
dered person the option of "passing" as a person traditionally gendered as male or female rather
than "coming out" as transgendered, this model seems more respectful of individual choice than
does Rothblatt's model.
103. BROWN & ROUNSLEY, supra note 1, at 160.
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of the construction of gender to a realization that the dimorphic paradigm
of sex itself is socially constructed."°4 Rothblatt's critique of sex mirrors
critical gender theory's understanding that gender and sex are socially
created and, ultimately, are exploited in our society to the detriment of
women and sexual minorities.
Rothblatt's theory, however, is of doubtful appeal to transsexuals.
Many transsexuals have no desire to blur the categories of male and fe-
male. After undergoing sex reassignment surgery, many MTF trans-
sexuals consider themselves (and desire others to consider them) as both
a gendered female and a biologically-sexed female." 5 Of course, many
transsexuals can accept that other transsexuals might choose to consider
themselves to be gendered as other than male or female. However, it is
critically important to many MTF transsexuals that they assume a tradi-
tional sex identity as female. Although Rothblatt's theory is clearly de-
signed to take account of the transsexual's situation, it in fact could prove
very threatening to many transsexuals by denying them femaleness, the
very category that they have struggled so long to attain.
Moreover, Rothblatt's vision does not easily translate into practical
social policy. In advancing her theory of sexual continuism, Rothblatt
does address directly the issue of the public restroom, an issue she refers
to as "The Bathroom Bugaboo." 1t 6 She views the segregation of bath-
rooms by sex as analogous to the "[u]biquitous 'whites only' and 'col-
oreds' signs hung in front of separate restroom facilities through much of
the South" during the 1950s and 1960s.'0 7
Rothblatt advocates that we replace sex-segregated restrooms with
unisex public restrooms. 08 In addressing issues of privacy, she advocates
placing toilets and urinals within enclosed stalls. Alternatively, she urges
that we eliminate urinals altogether, which favor persons with penises,
and install only sit-down toilets in public lavatories. In response to con-
cerns about rape, she suggests that bathroom security should be increased
by providing loop cameras to discourage restroom crime. She concludes:
The bathroom bugaboo is a legal problem because, as with race, rest-
room segregation reinforces social discrimination. It took laws to
104. See sources cited supra note 24.
105. Anne Bolin quotes one transsexual as suggesting that post-operative transsexuals create
a kind of new closet for themselves after surgery:
Transsexual people must learn to come out. The closet for them is as real as it is for
gay men and lesbians. But transsexualism has two closets .... That's where people
go after their transitions to deny their pasts and their transsexualism. It makes them
vulnerable to outing, just as it does the gay and lesbian community.
Bolin, Transcending and Transgenderings, supra note 2, at 473.
106. ROTHBLATT, supra note 24, at 91.
107. Id. at 92.
108. See id.
eliminate "whites only" lavatories. It took laws to mandate handi-
capped toilets. And it is taking laws to redress inadequate bathroom fa-
cilities for women. The best way to redress this harm, and to help
cleanse society of sexual apartheid, is to pass laws that mandate secure,
reasonably clean, unisex restrooms for all.Y19
Rothblatt's vision of unisex bathrooms is probably too threatening to
too many people to have a realistic possibility of implementation. Unisex
restrooms do not respect the choices of those who self-identify as male or
female and who want to have their privacy respected along biologically
defined lines. Similarly, these restrooms do not respect the choices of
MTF transsexuals who want to use the female restroom as an important
component of the gender identity they have assumed for themselves.
In her work, The Man in The Red Velvet Dress, J.J. Allen criticizes
Rothblatt's theory:
[Tihe majority of the population is also heterosexual, and what is het-
erosexuality but a sexual attraction toward the opposite sex? Male and
female are inescapable biological and sexual referents. To expect the
mainstream to radically reinterpret itself for the sake of transgenderist
ideology is the sort of conceit typical of a member of any minority.110
Even if one questions Allen's assertion that male and female are in-
escapable categories, the practicability of getting mainstream heterosexu-
als to give up their self-identity as male or female is unrealistic.
Rothblatt's vision purports to offer an alternative to a dimorphic vi-
sion of sex/gender. But does it really? Although she adopts the concep-
tual structure of a continuum to describe sex, her theory reinforces a di-
morphic view of sex by placing the categories "male" and "female" at
the endpoints of the continuum. Under such a view, individuals are in-
evitably defined as more or less male, or more or less female. The de-
termining concepts remain bipolar.
Rothblatt is correct to attack the notion that there is a necessary tie
between sex and gender. Individuals should be encouraged to experiment
and be creative when it comes to gender presentation, irrespective of
biological sex."' But in attempting to obliterate the categories of male
and female in favor of a view of biological continuity, Rothblatt may
have gone too far.
109. Id. at 95.
110. ALLEN, supra note 3, at 133.
111. See id. at 133-34.
Where's an evolutionary and sexual reality on top of which we have superimposed a
set of dubious gender constructs. I assert that it is masculinity and femininity (gen-
der), rather than male and female (sex), that form a continuum and therefore need re-
definition.
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First, the vast majority of individuals (96% on Rothblatt's own
terms) are born either male or female, implying a coordinance among
external genitals, internal reproductive organs, and chromosomes. This
is not to deny the existence of intersexed individuals. Nor is it to deny
the work of critical theorists such as Judith Butler'12 and Thomas
Laqueurl" who forcefully argue that sex itself is a product of social con-
struction. Nonetheless, in terms of classification, the categories of male
and female apply comfortably to an overwhelming majority of people.
Moreover, as Rothblatt herself seems to recognize, it may make perfect
sense to develop medical specialties along the lines of biological sex,
given medical problems and life changes that accompany male and female
biologies." 4
Second, despite advances in technology, human reproduction still
requires the presence of a male sperm and a female egg. (Of course,
cloning technology could change that in fundamental ways.) Granted,
intercourse between a man and a woman is no longer necessary for pro-
creation." 5 Nonetheless, in the context of human reproduction the bipolar
categories of male and female are difficult to overcome.
Third, the nature of human sexual desire highlights the most prob-
lematic defect inherent in Rothblatt's proposal to abandon the sex catego-
ries male and female. Rothblatt wants to believe that individuals are at-
tracted to sexual types organized along active/passive parameters. It
seems more likely, however, that human sexuality is organized along
genital/bodily lines. In general, a vast majority of people seem to be at-
tracted to gendered bodies, including certain genitals. Thus, irrespective
of questions of sexual orientation, people seem to be attracted to bodies
with penises (and public indicators of penises, such as beards and deep
voices), or vaginas (and public indicators of vaginas, such as breasts and
certain facial characteristics). Of course, some individuals are drawn to
both. But it is doubtful that male and female genitals are irrelevant to
human sexual attraction and desire.
Finally, Rothblatt's vision of a sexual continuum defies much em-
pirical research in cultural anthropology. Will Roscoe has noted:
It may, indeed, be arguable that all societies have at least two genders,
and... that these two genders are linked to perceptions of physiologi-
cal differences. What constitutes anatomical sex, however, which or-
112. See BUTLER, supra note 24.
113. See LAQUEUR, supra note 24.
114. See ROTHBLATT, supra note 24, at 13.
115. Procreation can and has been an important historical justification for oppression
against sexual minorities. Lesbians and gay men historically have been condemned for engag-
ing in non-procreative sex. See, e.g., Jonathan Ned Katz, Coming to Terms: Conceptualizing
Men's Erotic and Affectional Relations with Men in the United States, 1820-1892, in QUEER
WORLD, supra note 42, at 216.
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gans (or fluids or physiological processes) are considered the signs of
maleness and femaleness, has been shown by scholars in several fields
to be as much a social construction as what has been termed "gen-
der." I16
The bottom line seems to be that the sex/gender categories "male"
and "female" are here to stay. The weakness of Rothblatt's theory is that
it seeks to eliminate these categories by collapsing them into a unitary vi-
sion of sex/gender along a continuum. As suggested below, the great ad-
vantage of the alternative vision of a third sex/gender is that it leaves in-
tact the highly entrenched social categories of male and female. Instead,
the vision of a third sex/gender, "Other," accomplishes its subversive
goals through supplementation, not reduction, of sex/gender categories.
B. Evaluating the Vision of a Third Sex/Gender-The Restroom Labelled
"Other"
Unlike Rothblatt's vision of a sexual continuum, the introduction of
a third category carries with it certain cultural advantages. As the soci-
ologist George Simmel points out:
The dyad represents both the first synthesis and unification, and the first
separation and antithesis. The appearance of the third party indicates
transition, conciliation, and the abandonment of absolute contrast. 117
The introduction of a third category forces individuals to rethink
their prior ways of classification and to engage in a cultural dialogue over
the reasons that Western society created a dyad in the first place. Roth-
blatt's theory of sexual continuism fails as a useful social critique of di-
morphism because it relies heavily upon the dyadic endpoints of male and
female, suggesting only that these marginal points are at best vague and
uncertain. In contrast, the introduction of the triad is not about margins;
it is about core difference. The new category "Other," when conceptu-
alized as a third category, cannot be conceived as merely an offshoot of
one of the existing categories.
I propose that one of the most productive ways to implement the use
of a third sex/gender category to challenge Western sexual dimorphism is
through the adoption of a third public restroom labeled "Other." Recent
architectural theory has emphasized the interrelationship between how a
society constructs and arranges its physical spaces and how a society un-
derstands sex and gender."' Gilbert Herdt has suggested that the creation
116. Roscoe, supra note 74, at 69.
117. THE SOCIOLOGY OF GEORGE SIMMEL 145 (Kurt Wolff ed. & trans., 1951), quoted in
Herdt, Third Genders, supra note 69, at 105.
118. See, e.g., AARON BETSKY, BUILDING SEX: MEN, WOMEN, ARCHITECTURE AND THE
CONSTRUCTION OF SEXUALITY (1995); THE SEX OF ARCHITECTURE (Diana Agrest et al. eds.,
1996); DAPHNE SPAIN, GENDERED SPACES (1992); STUD: ARCHITECTURES OF MASCULINITY
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of a new physical space can have an important impact on an emerging
group's development of a sense of itself, and ultimately, an impact on the
broader society:
One of the findings of my own comparative work on culture, sexuality
and historical change has been to demonstrate that the intentional actor
in search of a new identity requires a separate social space; it is within
this liminal space that culture is created and transformed. 119
Accordingly, there is a need to create a physical site in which to im-
plement and test the vision of a third sex/gender category, "Other." The
virtually universal presence of the public restroom makes it an ideal "so-
cial space[] and cultural place[] for thirdness [to be] structured across the
course of life."1 o Only through the existence of such spaces can indi-
viduals in our culture begin to experiment with new categories of
sex/gender, and perhaps encourage broader social change directed to-
wards universal acceptance of all sexual minorities.
How does the vision of a new sex/gender category, "Other," and the
restroom labeled "Other," stand up to scrutiny under the parameters of,
first, acceptability to critical gender theorists and to transsexuals and,
second, practicability? Critical gender theorists, given their aim to cause
a Garber-like... category crisis concerning the dimorphic construction of
sex/gender, should find the vision of a third sex/gender category ex-
tremely attractive. The restroom labeled "Other" can serve as a mecha-
nism to assist in transforming our society from one which views all
sex/gender questions dimorphically to one which is more respectful of a
full range of sex/gender identities. The very existence of a restroom la-
beled "Other" forces all persons, especially those who choose to use the
restrooms labeled "Men" or "Women," to question their default assump-
tions about sex and gender. The category "Other" forces all to question
not only who should be entering the new door, but also to wonder who
and what belongs inside the doors labeled "Men" and "Women," an issue
heretofore always taken for granted. In particular, the existence of a
third door raises public awareness of the fluidity of the notions of male
and female. The door labeled "Other" raises central questions concern-
ing the boundaries of our existing concepts of sex and gender. Do
"Men," "Women," and "Other" refer to an individual's internal or ex-
ternal biology, gender presentation, orientation, or self-identity?"
(Joel Sanders ed., 1996); LESLIE KANES WEISMAN, DISCRIMINATION BY DESIGN: A FEMINIST
CRITIQUE OF THE MAN-MADE ENVIRONMENT (1992).
119. Herdt, Introduction, supra note 24, at 79.
120. Id.
121. See supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text.
122. Anne Bolin notes that "[plublic recognition and legitimacy of alternatives encourages
multiple treatment options and the opportunity for the continued decoupling of gender and sex."
Bolin, Transcending and Transgenderings, supra note 2, at 465.
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The idea of a third sex/gender category that must consciously be as-
sumed by an individual should prove attractive to transsexuals. Unlike
Rothblatt's vision, which by fiat places transsexuals somewhere along the
sexual continuum away from the endpoints of male or female, the vision
of a third sex/gender gives a transsexual the choice of whether or not to
identify as "Other." On the one hand, the transsexual (either pre-
operative or post-operative) may choose to "come out" as transsexual,
view herself as third-gendered, and accordingly, use the restroom labeled
"Other." On the other hand, if it is important to the transsexual's sense
of personal identity to assume the traditional sex/gender category of fe-
male, she may choose to self-identify as female (for the MTF transsex-
ual) and use the restroom labeled "Women." In other words, in contrast
to Rothblatt's vision, the vision of a third sex/gender is highly respectful
of an individual's choice of self-definition.
Moreover, to the extent that critical gender theory has accurately
recognized the impact of the medical profession on the self identity of the
transsexual, the category "Other" may enable some transsexuals to ques-
tion their own desire to undergo sex reassignment surgery. Instead, once
it is understood that gender identity and presentation, on the one hand,
and biological morphology, on the other, are not inextricably linked,
there may be more transsexuals who choose to live as transgendered per-
sons without undergoing surgery.
Is the vision of this new sex/gender category practicable? At a
minimum, it seems far more likely to be acceptable to the general public
than a single unisex bathroom. On the one hand, recognition of a third
sex/gender category would allow those comfortable with the categories
"Men" or "Women" to continue to self-identify according to those cate-
gories, and to use bathrooms so labeled. On the other hand, anyone
comfortable with the gender-bending nature of using a new bathroom la-
beled "Other" would be free to do so. Maintaining the existing two
doors shows respect to those who, for whatever reason, find it important
to maintain their sex/gender identity along traditional lines. At the same
time, the door labeled "Other" is a location of choice for those wishing to
challenge those traditional lines.
Kate Bornstein has suggested that all persons are potentially trans-
gendered in that all have the ability to transgress our culture's long-
standing gender norms. Accordingly, the restroom labeled "Other" is
available to all persons. An individual's decision to use that restroom for
the first time is an important step toward dismantling our culture's rigid
gender codes.
How might the idea be implemented? The obvious places to con-
sider creating third restrooms are lesbian and gay bars, and other estab-
lishments that cater to lesbian, gay, transsexual, and other transgendered
persons.
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Another way in which a third restroom is beginning to appear in
public spaces is as a result of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
("ADA"). " There is a deep irony in this fact. On the one hand, the
ADA explicitly excludes transsexualism from its ambit. 4 On the other
hand, the ADA Accessibility Guidelines for Buildings and Facilities,"
which set forth the statute's architectural requirements, not only allow the
use of a third "single-user" restroom in building alterations, 126 but af-
firmatively encourage the addition of a third restroom in new construc-
tion. 27 The upshot of these guidelines is that a statute explicitly not ap-
plicable to transsexuals in fact proves to be of particular utility to
transgendered people.
Conclusion
The etiology and nature of gender identity as a psychological con-
cept remains incredibly elusive. It may be a long time before science
determines the relative influences of nature and of nurture on gender
identity." In the meantime, our society needs to take the personal stories
of transgendered people in general, and of transsexuals in particular,
much more seriously. In this paper, I have suggested that one way of
doing so is to create a new flexible category of sex/gender, "Other," that
respects the needs of all "transgendered" persons, irrespective of how
they seek to transgress gender.
123. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-213 (1997).
124. Section 12211(b) of the ADA states:
Under this Act, the term "disability" shall not include-
(1) transvestism, transsexualism, pedophilia, exhibitionism, voyeurism, gender iden-
tity disorders not resulting from physical impairments, or other sexual behavior disor-
ders ....
42 U.S.C. § 12211(b)(1) (1997).
125. 36 C.F.R. § 1191, App. A (1997).
126. See 36 C.F.R. § 1191, App. A, A4.22.3 (1997).
127. In its "Recommendations" concerning new construction, the ADA Guidelines state:
1. In new construction, accessible single-user restrooms may be desirable in some
situations because they can accommodate a wide variety of building users. However,
they cannot be used in lieu of making the multi-stall toilet rooms accessible as re-
quired.
Id.
128. See, e.g., Stephen Whittle, Gender Fuckng or Fucking Gender?, in BLENDING
GENDERS, supra note 2, at 196, 209-10.

